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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT
Swimming in a Sea of No's: Managing and Controlling the New York Public Pools
by
Mette Lützhøft Jensen
Advisor: Sarah Chinn

Swimming in a Sea of No's: Managing and Controlling the New York Public Pools traces the genealogy
of the regulations, surveillance, and rules employed at New York public pools. The thesis discusses the
intent and implications of the spatial strategies created to order and control the environment
surrounding the swimming pools, and discusses how municipal public pools as specific, local
landscapes manifest broader social and cultural processes. The main focus is on the transformation of
the pools during the 1980s and 1990s, two decades after the fiscal crisis in 1975, when the pools had
become defunded, dysfunctional spaces. By tracing the fluid interplay between the problems that arose
at the pools, the public imagination, and the following response from the city, this analysis attempts to
illuminate how the pools were a key part of the overall emergence of neoliberal public strategies to
remake New York, and to remove what was considered urban disorder. Widening the scope even
further, this thesis also traces the genealogy of swimming pools back to New York's first public baths. I
argue that the changing political definition of pools, as well as their symbolic and cultural significance,
reflect the changing understanding of shared space throughout American history.
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Introduction
On a hot summer day in 2014, Sharon Coppola, a 70-year-old grandmother, took her 11-yearold granddaughter to the Tottenville Pool in Staten Island. Dressed in all white and a grey t-shirt, she
was denied entrance—only white t-shirts are allowed at New York public pools, she was told. A couple
of days after Ms. Coppola and her granddaughter returned, this time wearing a white t-shirt with the
print of a colorful bike on it. Once again, Ms. Coppola was denied entry because of her t-shirt. It had to
be white, and only white. Instead of sitting on the deck, Ms. Coppola watched her granddaughter swim
and play from a chained-off alleyway next to the pool. The grandmother was very upset about the tshirt rule, calling it “ridiculous” in the Staten Island Advance, who reported on the story.
“The rules are nothing new. We've had them year after year,” said a Parks Department
spokesperson, after the newspaper reached out. “You've got to follow the rules if you want to be in the
pool” (Rich, 2014).

***

New York's Parks Department operates 34 outdoor pools, 19 outdoor mini-pools, and 12 indoor
pools. The outdoor pools are free and open to the public from late June until Labor Day. Thousands of
New Yorkers use the pools every summer, which are spread relatively democratically over the five
boroughs, covering most neighborhoods. I consider the municipal pools, and especially the outdoor
public pools, a great asset to the city. These pools, many of which are massive enough to fit thousands
of swimmers, are equipped with diving boards, sun chairs, and a team of lifeguards. It's a great place
for families to escape the New York summer heat and for kids to splash around and learn how to swim.
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While being sites of great virtue, the New York public pools are simultaneously among the
city's most heavily regulated, ordered, and surveilled public spaces. Besides the rules around white
clothing, a visit also mandates a bag search, a thorough review of bathing suits (due to a requirement of
mesh lining, users may not swim in their underwear or regular clothes), and a check to make sure the
guest has brought a padlock (which must be a standard master or combination lock) (“Pool Rules”).
Ms. Coppola is not the only one who has come to know the pools' strict enforcement. Breeze
through Yelp reviews, and it's clear that many New Yorkers either know about the intricacies of the
pool rules, or they have found out the hard way. A reviewer named Annabelle L. awards the John Jay
Pool on the Upper East Side one star out of five, due to “a thousand of nonsensical rules”:
“First you need to bring your own lock, and they require this is a MASTER lock. then you must
put aaaaallll your belongings in your locker; for instance no way you could keep water and snacks with
you at the pool, or even a jumper in case you are cold.”
Another more experienced pool-goer, Brenna M., advises anyone thinking about going to an
outdoor pool to “bring a combination lock. They will not let you in without one.” She advises that you
follow the many rules and requests from staff (“Shake out your towel to prove you aren't smuggling in
contraband”) in order to enjoy this free, “hidden gem” (“John Jay Pool and Recreation”).
Though all urban public spaces (streets, parks, beaches, libraries) are regulated, ordered, and
surveilled to a degree, the pools surpass them all. Parks, for example, have rules that prohibit
unapproved vendors, loud music, sponsored events, fires, and biking (“§1-05 Regulated Uses”). But
there are no rules on attire, and access to the parks does not depend on bringing or not bringing certain
items. You can enter any park and stay there as long as you don't break the rules; public pools cannot be
entered before guests have complied. Central to my thesis is the question: Why? What makes the pool a
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different sort of shared public space, and what has led to these intense efforts of controlling its patrons?
To answer these questions, my thesis focuses on the New York public outdoor pools and their cultural,
social, and political transformation from the late 1970s through today. I argue that beginning with the
New York fiscal crisis in the 1970s, New York public pools as a public space have transformed in
accordance with the neoliberal shift of municipal governance in New York, set off by dramatic
reductions in federal, state, and municipal funding. These changes led to new spatial ordering strategies
at the municipal public pools, which today are sites of rigorous regulation, restriction, and surveillance.
I examine the genealogy of the various decisions that transformed the outdoor public pools, and
how the development of the public pools reflects the development of the city after the fiscal crisis. This
crisis birthed the neoliberal New York we know today, bringing with it the emergence of a new
neoliberal approach to spatial strategies. I examine how this shift affected New York's municipal pools
by focusing on three key historical moments. First, in response to New York's 1975 fiscal troubles,
crisis resolution measures paved the way for popular austerity policies and resurgent fiscal
conservatism, marking a shift of attention from social service programs to market stimulation. The
city's poorly funded outdoor pools crumbled and became sites of “urban disorder.” Second, local
instabilities, social issues, and rising crime rates during the second half of the 1980s created new
challenges in managing the city's pools. Widely reported incidents of on-site gang shootings, drug
dealing, and sexual assaults stigmatized them as centers of urban crime and juvenile delinquency.
Third, by the 1990s, the neoliberal ideologies that had started as crisis resolution measures in the
economic sphere, moved into the governmental sphere, shaping urban policy. This set in motion a
cascade of regulation—increased security measures, surveillance, police presence, and crowd control
measures—with consequences for New York and its low-income residents, who cool down at the pools
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during New York's sweltering summer heat.
We cannot fully understand today's pools as shared spaces without starting from the beginning:
the Progressive Era, when urban social reformers built New York’s first public baths. The reformers
understood the pools (and their purpose) through values of mental and physical hygiene, which
dominated the period’s political and cultural ideologies. Moving through time, I explore how the
conception of swimming pools as a shared space transformed through each new era—from Jim Crow to
the New Deal and the civil rights movement. Along the way, we see how exactly each era has reflected
the national and local ideals of how space should operate.
I claim that even though the public, political, and cultural understanding of shared space is
dynamic, the dualism of pools as both sites of democratization as well as control, conflict, and
regulation remains constant. The idea of the public sphere as a site of political deliberation and
participation, and therefore an essential part of democracy, is well-established in the literature (Smith
and Low 17). Furthermore, commentators have focused on public space as having the potential of
providing universal access and a sense of positive belonging for all. Geographer Don Mitchell sees the
fight over public space as central to the fight for social justice, claiming that “revolutions entail a taking
to the streets and a taking of public space” (Mitchell 149). In this view, the pools represent the
consummate democratic public space with potential for vibrant community life. As put by social
historian Jeff Wiltse, public pools “offer an informal social space—a meeting ground—where people
separated by social differences, large yards and high fences, busy lives and electronic entertainment can
interact and communicate face to face” (Wiltse 207). However, the same scholars who laud the positive
potential for public shared spaces also emphasize their ambiguity and complexity; public spaces can act
as sharp tools of exclusion, targeting certain classes or groups of people. Historian Daniel T. Rodgers
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conjectures that any form of social policy works to “impose discipline” on mind and body (23). To
fully understand municipal pools, we must investigate this double bind of shared space as a public good
as well as a site of discipline (Adiv 19-20).
But pools are unlike all other public spheres in one particular way. Simply: space is shared,
intensely. Swimmers dress down and expose their bodies in ways usually reserved for the private
sphere. This makes pools sites of sexuality and eroticism. Swimmers (almost naked strangers) share
one (relatively small, completely fixed) body of water with no inner delineations, the close proximity
leaving open the door for touch. And they aren't just sharing the water, but the bacteria within. This
forms communal trust, not just in the pool (I won't urinate if you won't) but even before swimmers
arrive on deck (I'll shower if you will). Add to all of this the fact that there are a large number of people
in relatively little space, especially compared to most beaches, parks, and playgrounds. This creates the
potential for a more frenetic atmosphere, harder for authorities to control. Lifeguards must keep an eye
out for roughhousing, as well as the myriad safety concerns water adds to the mix (breath-holding
contests, the possibility of drowning or injury).
All of these unique spatial features contribute to the need for measures of discipline, as well as
resistance by and negotiation from pool-goers, shaping swimming pools into a singular shared space.
As Jeff Wiltse points out, you just need to look at swimming pools to know how Americans relate to
one another across social lines (Wiltse, “America’s Swimming Pools”). Wiltse's seminal book (2007)
focuses on the history and cultural significance of pools in the northern United States, dedicating most
of his research to municipal pools before 1970. I add to his (and others’) work by focusing on the
development of New York municipal pools after the 1970s, and how their environment reflects the
wider cultural and political moment of the 1980s and 1990s, through today. The development of New
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York's public pools through the growth-obsessed era of Michael Bloomberg introduces new complexity
to this claim. In the final section, I explore how the unique spatial characteristics of swimming pools, as
well as their history as a contested site, excluded them from being a part of the so-called CEO-mayor's
vision of New York as a “luxury city.”
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Part 1
1890 – 1975: A Brief Historic Overview of Swimming Pools in New York

Swimming Pools to Reform the Working Class
Before swimming pools, New Yorkers still had to find ways of cooling themselves down in the
summer. In the late nineteenth century, swimming in the East and Hudson Rivers was a central part of
male working-class life (Wiltse 66). In Sidney Kingsley's 1935 play Dead End, a gang of juvenile boys
are portrayed growing up in the slum neighborhoods of Manhattan's Lower East Side, plunging, usually
naked, into the East River. Dead End depicts how the boys use “shocking jargon that would put a truckdriver to blush,” hustle, fight, gamble, and happily jump into “the sewerage at the foot of the wharf”
(11, 13). And while the rivers might have been cool, they were also beyond filthy. According to oral
histories, the young men swimming in the Hudson River faced a liquid wasteland of condoms, garbage,
rats, and worse. As one swimmer put it, “As a matter of fact, the first intestines I ever seen, came
floating down there once” (Wiltse 78).
Between 1868 and 1888, New York established 15 free open-air summer baths along its
waterfronts, the shape and depth of modern swimming pools, filled with river water. These pools were
very popular with working-class patrons, who used them as a safer and (at least somewhat) cleaner
alternative to the city rivers. The floating river pools exemplify how even the very first public pools
were surrounded by conflict and social control—as well as how the patrons negotiated and resisted that
power. The guests, young working-class men, considered the pools a place to have fun, splashing
around and escaping the city heat. The authorities, however, considered them a means to promote
cleanliness, and imposed a twenty-minute time limit for bathing. On hot summer days, young boys
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could be seen traveling between floating baths, dirtying themselves up in the process, in order to be
readmitted into the cool waters (Williams, The Great Unwashed 19).
During the Progressive Era, urban social reformers in New York and many other major U.S.
cities built public baths, both showers and giant, shared tubs, as part of the public bath movement. The
bath reformers saw the masses of unwashed workers living in New York slums as not only an economic
and sanitary problem, but also a threat to the social stability and unity of the community. The bath
reformers insisted that cleanliness was a way for the industrial poor to acquire the middle-class habits
of refinement and modesty. In other words, bathing would transform them into good Americans.
Nativism also played a role in the rationale for public baths, as the bath reformers believed that regular
bathing habits would have an effect on the Americanization of the immigrant, who, they argued, was
unclean (Williams 52). Historians ironically note that there is no evidence that the slum-dwellers
themselves were actually interested in having public baths, as bathhouses were rarely filled. It was only
when public baths started to be considered recreational spaces that they gained public popularity.
The first municipal indoor pools were opened in New York in 1906 and 1908—both in
working-class, immigrant Manhattan neighborhoods. As in pools in other northern cities, working-class
members of all ethnicities swam together, but women and men swam separately, due to Victorian era
ideals. While other northern cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia were prolific pool-builders, New
York was late to the game. In 1910, a city official named John Purroy Mitchel proposed building a
large, outdoor swimming pool and athletic complex in Central Park, modeled on the outdoor pools of
Chicago and Philadelphia. The project, however, was abandoned; middle- and upper-class citizens
didn't want to risk working-class culture encroaching on their park, which they considered their “oasis
of genteel recreation” (Wiltse 70). Even the play reformers, who lobbied for public playgrounds and
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recreation spaces in the city, had greatly opposed it, differing greatly from their counterparts in other
cities. While playgrounds were seen as a means to pull kids off the streets and promote directed,
organized play (socializing them into disciplined and moral citizens), New York play reformers saw
swimming pools as unfit for this purpose, as they tended to be boisterous, rowdy, and unorganized, thus
making them hard to control. Instead, working-class New Yorkers got their first outdoor pool in 1911
on a strip of Coney Island, far from the genteel, orderly residents of the Upper East and West Sides
(Wiltse 74-75).

Democratized Swimming for Everyone—Except African Americans
From the 1920s to the 1940s, thousands of new swimming pools were created across the U.S.,
many capable of accommodating thousands of swimmers at a time. Shared public space was a central
part of President Roosevelt's New Deal policies. To the Roosevelt administration, public pools and
parks symbolized democratized access to recreation, while investments in public works helped bring
the nation out of economic depression after the Great Recession (Gutman 532). Quite contrary to the
Progressive Era, municipal pools were now intended to promote family and community sociability, to
be shared spaces where all the city's residents would swim together, regardless of class—and gender.
Around this time swimming pools became gender-integrated for the first time. The Roaring Twenties
included women's right to vote, as well as a defiance of old Puritan values regarding how women
should look and act. At the swimming pools, the burgeoning liberation of femininity expressed itself in
the shrinking of swimsuits between 1920 and 1940. As Wiltse observes, this was also the starting point
of swimming pools acting as eroticized shared spaces (Wiltse 87).
New York was home to the largest pool-building project in the country, due in part to the work
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of Parks Commissioner Robert Moses, who secured federal funding. In the summer of 1936, 11
immense Works Progress Administration (WPA) pools opened to the public. They were distinguished
works of architecture, built in record time by relief workers and quickly packed with people. The
summer of 1936 was one of record-breaking heat, and more than 1.79 million New Yorkers swam in
the new public pools, over 600,000 of which were children under 14 (Gutman 532). Scholars have
shown that the progressive, liberal moment of the New Deal, however, was not as rewarding for all
Americans (Lieberman; Katznelson). African Americans were not welcome in these new, supposedly
communal spaces. As with much of the public policy of the time, racial prejudice was ingrained in
urban development. Furthermore, Wiltse argues that the racial segregation of pools was highly
connected to their gender-integration. The popular understanding of the time was that whites and blacks
should not swim together; in particular, African American men were seen as a sexual threat to white
women. This racist fear was heightened at the swimming pool, due to the intimate nature of pools as a
shared space and the state of communal undress (Wiltse 156; Smith 43). This racist stereotype was
strongest in the Jim Crow South, where pools were segregated by law. But de facto segregation also
kept African Americans out of the pools where white New Yorkers swam. Robert Caro argues that
Moses was influential in keeping pools racially segregated by locating the city’s WPA pools in either
white or black neighborhoods. Moses also kept the pool water cold, believing that “while not cold
enough to bother white swimmers [it] would deter any 'colored' people who happened to enter it once
from returning.” If that wasn't enough to keep African Americans away, the “flagging” of white
swimmers (staring, gawking, etc.) would do the trick (579). Other scholars disagree with Caro's
analysis. Marta Gutman argues that even though Moses was a racial conservative, and even though
structural racism meant that “the color line ran through pools in racially segregated neighborhoods,”
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Moses did actually welcome both black and white children at the pools for swimming programs. This
sets New York apart from most other cities, she argues, which succeeded in segregating public pools
during the New Deal (Gutman 532-533).

Privatized Swimming in the Suburbs
When, in the 1950s, federal rules desegregated public spaces, and African Americans could also
benefit from public pools, investment by white public officials dropped. In the South, local
governments often preferred to fill their pools with concrete, or even bulldoze them, than allow mixedrace swimming (Smith 46). When middle-class, white Americans moved to the postwar suburbs, the
privatized residential pool became a suburban institution. This change is well-illustrated in the short
story “The Swimmer” by John Cheever, seminal chronicler of New York suburbia. Here, the white
middle-class protagonist takes a break from his mundane existence and becomes a surreal sort of
suburban explorer, discovering a new route home by swimming through all his friendly (and
unfriendly) neighbors' pools until he, cold, fatigued, and disillusioned, finally reaches his own. In “The
Orphaned Swimming Pool,” John Updike tells the story of a “heavenly blue” suburban pool, which
almost takes on a life of its own after its owners' marriage, not as secretly as they would like, dissolves,
and the scrutinizing neighbors invite themselves over.
At this point, swimming pools came to illustrate how Americans had come to view private
space as safer than shared public space. By privatizing public space, the proprietor gains the ultimate
control of who to let in or what behavior is acceptable. As documented by Blakely and Snyder, the
transformation of pools can be seen as a precursor to the gated communities that sprang up all across
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the U.S., starting in the early 1980s.

Cooling Down Urban African American Youth
After a long period of dwindling interest in public pools, large cities once again started a “poolbuilding spree” in the mid-1960s—but with a much different rationale than before. In the mid-1960s,
cities across the country experienced race riots and violence, a response to racial injustices and growing
civil unrest. New York built 84 pools between 1966 and 1971 (many of which were so-called "mini
pools"), with the intent of alleviating the city's social tensions, which, it was believed, sweltered among
unemployed and poor African Americans during the summer months. With the help of federal “antipoverty” funds, New York, like many other cities, placed the majority of pools within African
American “ghettos” (Wiltse 181-182). This meant that, by the 1970s and 1980s, tens of millions of
mostly white middle-class Americans swam in their private backyard pools or suburban pool clubs
while most African Americans and Latino Americans swam in inner-city municipal pools (Wiltse 2). In
the 1970s and 1980s, New York also entered a new era of fiscal austerity, and once again the popular
understanding of shared, public space was to be reconstructed.
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Part 2
The 1980s: Dreadful Pools in a Dangerous City
On the morning of October 30, 1975, New Yorkers picked up their issue of the Daily News to
read a startling headline: "FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD." President Gerald Ford had decided to deny
New York the federal assistance it needed to avoid bankruptcy. In the eyes of the Republican president,
the city had brought its fiscal troubles on itself, through decades of reckless public spending. As Kim
Phillips-Fein has pointed out, the fiscal crisis marked a political opportunity for the Ford administration
to teach America's liberal cities a lesson on public spending (Phillips-Fein 97). New York City had been
the epitome of urban liberalism, flooded with (unionized) blue-collar workers who received decent
wages—an example of how the government could alleviate problems of poverty, racism, and economic
inequality. Historian Joshua Freeman called it “an island of social democracy in the midst of postwar
America” (Phillips-Fein 5). New York had pushed the egalitarian ideologies of Lyndon B. Johnson's
Great Society program further than the rest of the country—especially the elimination of poverty and
racial injustice—which was why the national fiscal crisis hit New York especially hard. When the
country went into recession, New York was the home of large-scale programs that were made
inexpensive or free to the public: the subway system, playgrounds, free museums and colleges, and the
largest, most elaborate system of public swimming pools in the country.
In the 1970s, the national economy went into a severe recession. The crisis was caused by a
combination of decreased growth after the booming postwar decades, increased oil prices after several
oil shocks in 1973, and rapid inflation caused by the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement (PhillipsFein 1). Within a short timespan, New York experienced a dramatic loss of manufacturing jobs; half a
million vanished between the late 1960s and mid 1970s. At the same time, the city's white population
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was packing up and moving out to the suburbs, as federal policies promoted urban disinvestment and
“white flight” from the inner city. In New York, many neighborhoods were low-income, and so as the
economy eroded, a great number of people were in need of city services, putting immense pressure on
the city economy (Phillips-Fein 22). In order to correct its deficit and pay back its debt, the city cut its
expenses dramatically, entering a new era of austerity economics. This strategy relied on a restructuring
of the government, as well as new policies focusing on tax subsidies, incentive zoning, and
deregulation. To revive the city, New York shifted away from its earlier commitment to community
development and human capital and looked towards the market and its financial elites (Sites 40). And
the strategy seemed to be working. As Mayor Edward Koch won a third term in 1985, New York's
Manhattan-centered, private wealth-run economy was booming, the tourism industry was on the rise,
and white-collar yuppies could be sighted everywhere downtown. Many poorer areas, however, didn't
profit from such reinvestment; those neighborhoods saw continually increasing rates of inequality,
joblessness, homelessness, infant mortality, drug-related violence, and overall crime (Sites 47).
The impact of the cutbacks was especially visible across the city's public recreation spaces:
parks, playgrounds, and pools. According to geographer Themis Chronopoulos, by the late 1970s, it
was “obvious that New York’s 38.5 square mile park system had fallen into grievous disrepair.” The
number of parks employees had been steadily declining. Garbage was not being collected. The Parks
Department lacked functioning equipment and had to postpone many projects because of planned
renovations (Chronopoulos 109). During this time, some pools closed entirely, and most crumbled into
disrepair. Between 1970 and 2000, overall attendance dropped steadily. By the 1980s, the New York
public pools were in “dreadful” shape, a situation not unique to New York. In the 1970s and 1980s,
public pools across the northern states followed a similar pattern of being “plagued” by violence,
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rowdiness, gang war, drug dealing, and vandalism (Wiltse 182).

The “Uncontrollable” McCarren Pool
One of the pools deteriorating the most was McCarren Pool, located at the border of the
Greenpoint and Williamsburg neighborhoods, in northern Brooklyn. Built by Robert Moses in 1936,
McCarren Pool was one of 11 massive WPA pools constructed during the New Deal era. It served
thousands of children and adults—especially those from working-class neighborhoods. The decline of
McCarren Pool has perhaps a more dramatic history than most other public pools, but it serves as a
useful example of how pools failed during this time period, and what exactly the consequences were.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the pool would often open late because of mechanical problems.
Some days, the pool didn't open at all. Many of the showers became inoperable. Garbage floated in the
water. On top of these eyesores, the chlorination system was frequently malfunctioning, causing
children to get skin rashes. Records show that the number of pool employees decreased, and the
diminished staff had difficulty disciplining the large number of pool patrons. When employees called
the police, they found the department was as overextended as they were; frequently the officers didn't
even show up. The pool area became vandalized, and parks employees were slow to repair the fences,
making trespassing and further vandalism even more likely (Chronopoulos, “The Politics of Race”
110). In the post-World War II period, the neighborhood's racial makeup had changed, as Latinos and
African Americans began to move to Brooklyn in great numbers and became the majority users of
McCarren Pool—all while the pool staff stayed mostly white. Chronopoulos claims that the new
presence of non-whites in the neighborhood was resented by many of the white locals, who argued that
it had been taken over by prostitutes and criminals and other “undesirable” people (Chronopoulos,
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“The Politics of Race” 108). The scene at the pool was, in short, a mix of racial resentment and
systematic malfunction, all of this rendering the pools “uncontrollable.” Ultimately, white locals rallied
to have McCarren Pool closed. In 1983, it finally did, due to an accidental flooding of the filter plant—
and would go on to remain closed for more than two decades. The planned renovation of the pool was
put off because of opposition and protest from white locals, some of whom wanted to shut it down
entirely and replace it with a soccer field (Mendell 1986). They also discussed compromising, simply
by reducing the size of the pool, so it would be able to accommodate much fewer than the current
capacity of 6,800. The main argument for scaling down the pool was to make it easier to control the
crowds, thus reducing undesirable behavior (as well as undesirable people). This simple measure of
crowd control was also employed at other WPA pools (Chronopoulos, “The Politics of Race” 110). The
immense size of the pool had once been a testament to the great vision of urban developers: that
community spaces should be at the core of public life. But after the fiscal crisis, the understanding of
public space was rapidly shifting away from such a positive view. Soon, mirroring the negative opinion
of the general public, the pools became defunded. They were now an example of problematic shared
space.

Dangerous City, Dangerous Pools
This perception was further exacerbated by New York's increasing crime rate, starting in the
1980s and soon reaching volumes not seen since the 1930s, significantly higher than the U.S. average.
The causes were multiple, but most important was the dramatic increase in poverty and homelessness
between 1980 and 1993, the effects of dramatic spending cuts on employment and training, as well as
drastic cuts in welfare benefits to the poor (i.e. direct financial support, food stamps, and medical
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benefits). Add to this the Reagan era’s deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, who were released into
communities without adequate resources to support them. On top of everything, the emergence of crack
cocaine in 1985 opened up an explosive, new market for drug sale (Bowling 537; Searight and Handal
249-250), a dilemma the police force (which had been dwindling since the cutbacks of the fiscal crisis
up through the early 1980s) struggled to combat (Chronopoulos 119).
Through the 1980s, the number of Parks Department employees decreased significantly. In the
1930s, Parks Commissioner Robert Moses had about 30,000 parks employees at his disposal. In 1986,
the Parks Department had a total of 4,951 full-time budgeted positions, a number that declined
gradually to 3,261 in 1992 (Chronopoulos 109). Likely due to the same mechanisms at work at
McCarren Pool (a decrease in pool employees, poor maintenance, and general dysfunction), the pool
staff found it even harder to discipline their charges. On multiple occasions throughout the late 1980s,
the Parks Department requested more police enforcement at the pools, complaining of neglect from the
department. In the summer of 1988, the monthly report from the Department of Parks and Recreation
detailed around 50 fights, riots, and attacks on agency personnel at Staten Island pools and beaches.
According to the Parks Commissioner, the problem resulted from: “the overwhelming number of 16-25
year olds who behave inconsiderately and disrespectfully.”

In addition to fighting, they play loud music, smoke, drink, eat in the immediate pool area,
and bathe in their street clothes and shoes. Often, they do not use the regular entrance but climb
over the fences. At the larger pools, fights have broken out between 'diving gangs'
monopolize access to the diving boards (“Monthly Report for December” 1988).

who try to
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The summer after, in 1989, two different shootings occurred at two Manhattan pools. The first
shooting, at Lasker Pool in Central Park, wounded one person. The second, a few days later at
Highbridge Pool in Upper Manhattan, wounded three and tragically killed a 13-year-old girl. The New
York Times called the shootings “drug-related,” which painted the pool as a highly dangerous place: “A
day at the pool can be a tense experience. Gangs stake out territories in the pool area. They often pick
fights at the slightest provocation” (Lorch 1989).
The New York Times does not mention any evidence that the shooting was gang-related, but by
assuming the involvement of gangs, the newspaper helped construct the incident as part of a growing
threat (which already occupied much of the public's mind). In Random Violence, Professor of sociology
and criminal justice Joel Best discusses the rising fear of gangs (and gang initiation rituals) in the early
1990s, observing how single incidents often were used as evidence of widespread problems and social
crises. He concludes that this dynamic often led to the adoption of new laws, evidenced by bag checks
becoming standard protocol at the entrance of the pools. I also find it plausible that the contemporary
“white t-shirt rule” (only white t-shirts and hats are allowed in and out of the pool) was introduced as a
result of concerns over gang activity. I haven't been able to track down the decision for this particular
rule, but in 2015, the New York Post wrote that the “white t-shirt rule” was first introduced “as an antigang measure, after an explosion of violence,” including the fatal shooting at Highbridge Pool in 1989
(Jamieson 2015). In 2007, Borough Parks Commissioner Thomas Paulo also alluded to gang activity as
the rationale behind the white t-shirt rule in an interview with the Staten Island Advance. Paulo
explained that the rule was intended to eliminate “those kinds of symbols. It is to remove anything that
might promote antagonism in the pool environment” (“Crackdown on wardrobe at city pools” 2007).
The first time an article mentioned the rule was in 1999, when a New York Times reporter describes his
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day at the pool:
“I would learn that the pools are a place of rigid rules as much as of fluidity and freedom: only
white hats and T-shirts, no radios, no food, no newspapers” (Martin, “A Day in the Water” 1999).

Controlling Behavior at the Pools
The idea of removing gang symbols in order to control conflict and violence is not new. During
the 1990s, U.S. inner-city elementary and secondary schools experienced a resurgence in dress codes in
an effort to quell rising youth involvement in gangs. The logic behind dress codes is that gang violence
is not only associated with certain clothing and symbols (which denote gang membership), but that they
produce or encourage violence when worn to school. Some sources say that controlling dress through
regulation from authorities has proven to be effective. However, scholars have noted that the link
between school attire and gang violence hasn't been fully proven, and neither has the assumption that
dress codes prevent students from joining gangs (Crockett and Wallendorf 120). Because dress codes
destroy the identity of the gang, proponents assume they work—and yet, youths who want to display
gang identity find other ways. In light of this, it seems dress codes mainly work as a statement to the
public that school administrators are in control of the situation (Crockett and Wallendorf 121-122).
These same dynamics are likely at play with the “white t-shirt rule.” If pool patrons wish to express
membership to gangs or other violent groups, they don't need a colorful shirt to do so. Most
importantly, the rule sends a message to the public that pool officials are in control. Sociologists,
beginning with Michel Foucault, have argued that the ultimate power of social control lies in the
“microphysics” of control—such as attitudes, beliefs, and values. This includes expression through
clothing. In prisons, the generic uniforms prisoners are compelled to wear help erase the prisoners’
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individuality, which again helps to bring their conduct ‘into line’ (Reiter 586). The same rationale
seems to be behind the dress code rules of the pools, which were becoming increasingly hard for the
authorities to control. The “white t-shirt rule” was only the beginning of a new era of regulation
attempting to control the pools. As disorder increased, so did media attention, forcing municipalities to
reshape how they understood shared space.
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Part 3
1990s: Zero Tolerance—Both In and Out of the Pool
The budget of the Parks Department was continually, drastically reduced. By the summer of
1991, there was simply no money to open the pools. The previous summer, only a select few had
opened, leading to many of the city's 100,000 fire hydrants being used as “ad hoc pools,” which used
up about a million gallons each day (“City Will Open” 1991). The act was vandalism of public
property, of course, but it can also be seen as the only way of cooling down in lieu of actual pools, and
a way for the youth to “talk back” to the city who had taken away access to spaces they considered
theirs. Historian Joe Austin argues that, around the same time, graffiti artists were using their writing as
a way of “talking back” to the city, as “part of the larger, dispersed, and ongoing struggle for public
space among marginalized groups in the United States” (Austin 4). Graffiti artists' acts of social
criticism were, however, deemed as nothing but malignant vandalism. It is likely that the authorities
and the public saw the actions of those kids in this same light.
Parts of the public did support the existence of municipal pools, but the rationale was not based
around the rights of urban youth. Echoing the same opinions of the 1960s, they thought the pools
should serve as a way of keeping urban youth out of trouble during the hot summer months. In a letter
to the Office of the Mayor, a worried New Yorker shared his ideas on how to keep the pools open in
spite of a shrinking budget. He explained this was of great urgency, as the contrary would lead to
trouble, as “many young men and women may find it difficult to stay away from trouble during the hot
summer months ahead” (Rivera 1991). It's ironic that, while increasingly being thought of as sites of
disturbance and trouble, public pools were also spaces were delinquent youth ought to be “placed” to
avoid trouble—spaces which would keep the troublemakers fenced in, away from the rest of the city.
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Private Money and Public Pools
The pools eventually opened, but not because it received necessary public funding. In July,
Mayor Dinkins initiated a fundraising campaign, which he named “Do it for New York”—an attempt to
raise enough money to keep the pools open until Labor Day. The mayor pleaded for “all New Yorkers
to give what they can to help keep the heat of this recession off the backs of our young people”
(“Remarks by Mayor David N. Dinkins” 1991). Without private money, the pools would have to close
again for the remainder of the summer. The mayor’s plea didn't go without notice. Shortly after, a grant
of $2 million was donated by the Sol Goldman Charitable Trust, a nonprofit created by one of New
York's richest real estate moguls, Sol Goldman. Ironically, Goldman earned his wealth working in the
booming real estate market during the 1980s, incentivized by the same tax breaks from which the pools
were suffering (Saxon 1987). This desperately needed injection of cash serves as a good example of
how private money increasingly partnered up with municipal governance in New York's new urban
neoliberalism. After the fiscal crisis, New York turned to the private sector and philanthropy in order to
build and maintain public spaces.

Pool Disorder Becomes an “Emerging Issue”
The Sol Goldman Charitable Trust donation kept the pools open the summer of 1991. The
funding, however, worked more as a Band-Aid than a solution to the ongoing problems of the defunded
public pools. In spite of the earlier efforts of Mayor Koch to quell urban unrest by spending more on
police (at the time, the greatest expansion of the city’s three police forces), the situation only worsened
after 1985, with homelessness and poverty rates reaching record highs. New York's public, shared
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spaces became sites where “urban disorder”—such as the drug trade, homelessness, graffiti, and street
crime—was most visible (Chronopoulos 119). Letters to the Department of Parks and Recreation
indicate that homeless people using the pools worried locals in the Lower East Side. In one letter, a
resident of the neighborhood named Elizabeth Acevedo wrote that “our park is being used as a shelter
and now our swimming facilities are being turned into public bathhouses” (Acevedo 1990).
In the spring of 1990, the Office of the Mayor was sent several memoranda from the Parks
Department, in which the newly appointed commissioner, Betsy Gotbaum underlined that “insufficient
pool security” remained one of the departments “major concerns” for the approaching summer season.
The department requested six police officers at each Olympic-sized pool, and two at the smaller pools,
in order to establish early measures of “crowd control and security” (“April Monthly Report” 1990).
The request was denied. In his response, First Deputy Mayor Norman Steisel cited budget reductions,
and argued that the amount of police coverage the commissioner had requested was “very costly.”
Steisel advised that the department instead employ their Parks Enforcement Patrol officers at the pools
(Steisel 1990). As summer rolled around and the pools opened, Commissioner Gotbaum’s tone became
more urgent. In the June monthly report to the Office of the Mayor, the now “deeply concerned”
commissioner highlighted the public pools as the most “emerging issue”, because they continued “to
attract illegal activities and periodic outbursts of violence.” To make her case stronger, the
commissioner attached the past week's “morning reports”, documenting that multiple pools had
experienced vandalism and group assaults. At Staten Island’s Lyons Pool, “35 youths forced their way
into the pool and started to harass patrons.” At another pool in the Bronx, a patron had dropped a gun
on the deck. The commissioner requested more NYPD officers, reasoning that “it is hard to imagine
that NYPD would not cover any gathering of over 500 youths, and yet still the assumption is often that

24

such crowds in a park's pool are not a matter for their concern” (“June Monthly Report” 1990). A
handwritten note on the bottom of the memorandum, possibly by the First Deputy Mayor Norman
Steisel (to whom the memorandum was directed), provides an interesting insight into the municipal
understanding of the pool’s problems. It reads:
“Donna—we have been told that pool attendance decline after July. Perhaps the worst of this is
over. They don't need PO—they need to lobby for gun control.”
This comment likely reflects how the Dinkins administration initially viewed the problems at
the pools as a reflection of the city's problems with gun violence and drug dealing. As the troubles
escalated in the following years (catching the attention of the media), this view changed.

The “Whirlpooling” Menace
On July 7, 1993, The New York Times published an article titled “A Menacing Ritual Is Called
Common in New York Pools.” The article described how a 14-year-old girl had her bathing suit top
“ripped off” by several boys, one of whom also “inserted his finger in her vagina.” The article further
reported that the attack was not a stand-alone incident. According to the reporter, Michel Marriott,
swimmers and supervisors at several other city pools said that “whirlpools,” in some form, had long
been a feature of inner-city swimming pools:
“They call it ‘the whirlpool,’ and pool employees and regular swimmers say it has become a
common, if malevolent, ritual of these sweltering summer days at some of New York City's municipal
pools (…) Groups of teenage boys lock arms and shoulders and move in circles through the expanse of
blue, churning the cool, chlorinated water, chanting rap lyrics and fondling girls at will.” (Marriott
1993).
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The Parks Department reacted promptly, arranging a poolside news conference. At the event,
Parks Commissioner Betsy Gotbaum argued that the incident was due to “horseplay” that “got out of
hand.” She promised, however, to enhance security at the pools, and insured the press that four, instead
of one, police officers would be patrolling the Crotona Pool in the future (Marriott 1993). A few days
after, two other sexual attacks were reported. In one, a 14-year-old girl had been fondled and had her
bathing suit top ripped off by 5 to 10 boys at the People's Pool in Brooklyn. In the other incident, two
girls (11 and 12) told the police that they were swimming in the Haffen Park pool in the Baychester
section of the Bronx when they were lifted up and fondled by a man in his 30s. Though very different
types of assaults, the article placed them both within the “whirlpooling phenomenon” (Faison 1993).
More attacks followed in the summer of 1993. 24 days after the first attack, a total of 17 girls had been
sexually assaulted at the pools, resulting in 30 arrests (McFadden 1993). The following two summers,
headlines of sexual assaults and whirlpooling at New York public pools were frequently seen in the
news. In 1994, stories of sexual assault were reported during the opening of the pools, July 5–13, and
arrests were made in “8 out of 10 cases” (“Make the Pools Safe for Everyone” 1994). But the rest of
the summer saw no more incidents. In the 1995 season, only one incident was noted, a 12-year-old girl
who was the victim of a group attack. It seemed the whirlpooling phenomenon had come and gone. The
next and only group attack since was reported in 1999 (Adiv 165).

Locating the Cause of Whirlpooling
The sexual assaults likely garnered interest (from both the media and the public) for several
reasons. One was the naming of the phenomenon (“whirlpooling”), which shaped the sexual attacks
into a coherent, singular phenomenon (Adiv 162). This can be partially justified, since several of the

26

reported attacks shared the same characteristic of being perpetrated by a group. But then again, several
attacks were reportedly carried out by individuals. In all cases between 1993 and 1994, the media spoke
of incidents within the context of whirlpooling. This exaggeration of the organization and scope of the
problem did not go unnoticed by the Parks Department, who, in departmental monthly reports,
complained about how the Daily News specifically attempted to “stir up anxiety” with an article on the
Sunset Pool in Brooklyn, which had the headline “Pool of Fear” (“Weekly Report #26” 1994). In 1994,
new Parks Commissioner Henry J. Stern (who served from 1983 to 1990, and then again from 1994 to
2000), wrote that “although the newspapers have loosely used the term whirlpooling in reporting on
some of these incidents, we have in fact not experienced ‘whirlpooling’—numerous males forming a
whip-like human chain and acting in concert to assault female bathers—since the pools opened”
(“Weekly Report # 25” 1994). The Parks Department tried to counterbalance the fear and anxiety that
had resulted from the attacks. Their responses ranged from the departing Parks Commissioner Betsy
Gotbaum's outright dismissal of the problem as “horseplay”, which had gone on since “time
immemorial” to Stern, her successor, who framed the attacks as “isolated incidents,” arguing that the
pools were as safe as ever. According to him, the many reported attacks reflected how women had
learned it was okay to come forward (Wolff 1994).
By perpetuating the term “whirlpooling,” the media used rhetoric to shape public perceptions
about the crime that was taking place. According to historian Joel Best, rhetoric is the most powerful
determiner for which concerns society perceives as a crisis. When used strategically, rhetoric shapes
public perceptions, making us believe in the urgency of a problem. This idea is closely related to the
sociological concept of “moral panic,” where rhetoric is used to make claims on a cultural problem.
This process often entails exaggerating and expanding the scope of the problem’s organization and

27

novelty. This kind of melodrama, Best argues, has a universal appeal (Best 80-81). With melodramatic
descriptions of the incidents, the news media that reported on the “whirlpooling” attacks helped shape
public perceptions of the crime. One newspaper detailing the events all the way from Montreal,
Canada, described the victims as “prey” (Channing 1993). Closer to home, The New York Times
described the assaulters as “a floating posse” “menacing every unprotected girl” (Marriott 1993).
Sociologist Stanley Cohen describes “moral panic” as when a person (or a group) becomes defined as a
threat to societal values and interests—a “scapegoat” or “folk devil” onto which public fears and
fantasies are projected. And the media will typically present the threat using stereotypes, Cohen argues.
The underlying cause of moral panic is something entirely different from its object, however. It is the
“cultural strain and ambiguity” caused by social change (Hunt 631).
New York had surely witnessed cultural change. Starting in the 1950s, “white flight” had
changed the racial makeup of New York from 6.1 percent African American in 1940 to 28.7 percent in
1990. At the same time, urban poverty rates for black Americans had increased sharply. By the 1990s,
New York had become a city “fraught with racial tension” (Mexal 6) and the public imagination was
fixated on a particular kind of black masculinity. In November 1995, the political scientist John J.
Dilulio Jr. published an essay in the Weekly Standard called “The Coming of the Super Predators,”
arguing that the generation heading towards adolescence around this time was unusually depraved
because these young people were growing up in what he called “moral poverty” (Dilulio 1995).
Professor of English Stephen Mexal observes how, starting in the 1980s, black bodies and culture were
seen as a threat towards the restructuring of urban economies and governance. The white fear driving
this threat, Mexal argues, “can be seen in brief eruptions of urban bourgeois panics and the mass media
fascination with race- and class charged episodes.” Among the most acute examples of this dynamic

28

was the rape of the Central Park jogger that constructed the racially loaded term “wilding” (Mexal
105). This is not to say that what the young people at the public pools experienced did not happen, or
that the fear of attacks was merely a product of mass hysteria. Commentators have stressed that it is
important to consider that real fear about crime is intimately related to moral hysteria about crime, and
that the mass media serve and exaggerate such public fears (Hunt 637). It is equally important to point
out that, however real the fear was, the moral hysteria was racialized. Instead of focusing on the victims
of the crime, and their race and vulnerability (most victims were likely women and girls of color), the
public imagery focused only on the race of the assaulters.
In the press coverage of the sexual attacks at the public pools, expressions and terms were
employed which painted a gruesome picture of the experience of swimming in the city’s public pools.
The language alluded to the authorities as having lost control of the pools they were supposed to keep
safe. One article described a “whirlpool,” which started out playfully but “spun out of control,” and
was an “intimidating force of nature to stop” (Marriott 1993). In many articles, the pools were
described as “crowded” (Marriott 1993, Faison 1993, McFadden 1993) and words expressing the heat
(“sweltering summer days”; “another oppressing day”) helped to construct the idea that the hot setting
of the pools caused the attacks.
In her dissertation, geographer Naomi Adiv analyses how the sexual attacks were explained by
reporters, government officials, and the public. She cites articles which, either directly or indirectly,
point to rap music, behavioral problems, and an “uncontrolled culture of urban masculinity” as being to
blame for the sexual attacks. These referrals are pregnant with race anxiety (167). An example is the
first article published on whirlpooling by The New York Times. Both the reporter and interview subjects
suggest that the attacks are “symptomatic of a growing sexual hostility between young boys and girls,”
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and a culture of “misogyny on the rise,” from which “comes the music, and from that comes the t-shirts
and slogans and chants that influence how young people think” (Marriott 1993). Media reports also
mention the young boys chanting a line from either of two popular rap songs at the time, named almost
identically: “Whoomp! (There It Is)” and “Whoot, There It Is.” The mentioning of the rap song works
to root the problem in African American culture. In the summer of 1993, the line “Whoomp, there it
is!” was “the hottest phrase in the country”, according to The New York Times, who noted that “very
few people outside of the black urban environment are aware of this phenomenon” (Herbert 1993). As
a response, Mayor Dinkins rolled out two campaigns in 1993, called “Don't Dis Your Sis” and “Halt the
Assault,” intended to stop pool assaults. The mayor also hoped to “get rap groups to write songs
encouraging their listeners to treat women with respect” (McLarin 1993). The “hip” language of the
campaigns, and the mayor's focus on rap music, “tell us a great deal about where he (and likely many
others) located the source of the violence,” Adiv notes (168). Though I agree to a great length with this
analysis, I think it's important to mention that Mayor Dinkins did, in fact, make it clear in an interview
that rap music wasn't to blame for the attacks:
“What's to blame is society (…) We, each of us, must do better by our young people in terms of
behaving as role models and expressing our displeasure at behavior we know is not proper” (McLarin
1993).
Aside from race, the media also had a major effect on the municipal understanding of shared
space in the 1990s. Explanations in the media located the problems of disorder and especially sexual
violence as a spatial problem inherent to the unique characteristics of the swimming pool—a “spatial
panic.” By using the technology of language and naming the sexual attacks a site-specific name,
“whirlpooling”, the pool attacks were framed as incidents that only happened in water. This tied the
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attacks directly to the space and the water in which the crime occurred, and not to sexual violence on a
greater scale. This framing divorced the attacks in the water from the problems of sexual violence in
other kinds of public spaces, as well as private space, where most sexual assaults occur (Adiv 168). The
attacks were also removed from the context of the social tensions and local instabilities of New York in
the 1990s.
This framing—that the problems were inherent to the pools and the way they operate as shared
spaces—was only possible because of the unique spatial key features of the pool. As discussed earlier,
pools are sites of sexuality, close proximity, and possible intimacy due to the sharing of a single body
of water. When framed as a site that invited specific problems due to its very nature, it made the people
managing it responsible for the problems occurring in and around them. In this logic, the solution to the
problems naturally also had to be site-specific. On July 7, 1994, Commissioner Henry J. Stern told The
New York Times that, in order to control crowds and put an end to any undesired behavior, the
administration was considering segregating the pools by sex or age. This, he reassured, would be “a
simple and cheap approach” (Martin, “Segregating by Sex” 1994). The idea of segregating the pools
was short-lived, possibly due to the mixed reactions to the initiative. Instead, the Parks Administration
chose another site-specific solution: an increase in security, policing, and crowd control measures.

Mayor Giuliani's War Against Urban Disorder
Right around the time of the “whirlpooling menace”, the city elected a new mayor. In January
1994, Republican Rudolph Giuliani stepped onto the podium at New York City Hall, declaring in his
inaugural speech that change was coming to New York. The change, he asserted, would be “built
around law and justice” and a reversal of “the growing trend of ever-increasing tolerance for lawless
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behavior” (“The New Mayor”). Mayor Giuliani kept his word. During the mid-1990s, he introduced a
now-famous spatial ordering strategy to reduce crime levels called the “Zero Tolerance” policy. This
was a particularly muscular version of the “Broken Windows” philosophy, based on the idea that, if
tolerated, any indicator of “urban disorder” (from panhandlers to drunks, rowdy teenagers to loiterers)
could lead to serious crime. According to this logic, minor incivility should be controlled and reduced
with the same rigor as dangerous crime. “Urban disorder,” such as graffiti, symbolized “the spiraling
loss of public authority,” as one editorial in The New York Times put it. Reinstating authority—by, say,
scrubbing the subway free of graffiti, or displacing prostitution and drug dealings from the public
eye—would in turn help quell crime (Chronopoulos 91). Mayor Giuliani also secured an immense
increase in the police force. Soon after taking office, he hired around 7,000 new police officers, and
appointed William Bratton as Commissioner of the NYPD. Bratton set out to reform the way the police
force operated, rejecting any sort of ‘root cause’ theory in regard to crime. He argued that attempting to
understand the social correlations of crime—such as poverty or unemployment—had led nowhere. In
his mind, the root cause of crime was, simply, the criminal (Bowling 542).
Giuliani's mayorship illustrates how neoliberal ideology had shifted from being pervasive in the
economic sphere to now also expressing itself in urban governance. Neoliberal ideology supposed that
the free market would order individuals and their activities, whereas the liberals before them had
sought to order individuals through social policies. Themis Chronopoulos argues that neoliberals were
“overwhelmed” by the effects of human displacement visible in public space. The solution became a
strategy of “banishing” the disorderly individuals, whereas earlier (non-neo) liberals had sought to
“produce orderly individuals” (2). Because crime dropped in the same period that Zero Tolerance was
implemented, Giuliani and Bratton claimed that the strategy worked. Even though many commentators
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have rejected this boast, the political value of cracking down on urban disorder had made its imprint,
and cities all over the world have since embraced the strategy (Beckett and Herbert 33).

Policing crowds at the pools
Zero Tolerance was also the age of crucial spatial transformations at public swimming pools. As
mentioned earlier, in 1990, Parks Commissioner Betsy Gotbaum had urged the Office of the Mayor to
assign more police officers at the pools. Her request had been denied, but attitudes changed
dramatically in the following years, when the stories of sexual attacks in the public pools started
breaking. These media accounts, as well as the subsequent interdepartmental correspondences, show
that, as sexual attacks were reported (and reporters increasingly demanded answers from the
authorities), the number of police officers patrolling or assigned to the pools increased significantly. In
1993, 64 city police officers were patrolling the pools (McFadden 1993). In 1994, each of the more
than 50 outdoor pools had been assigned at least two, and as many as six, police officers. Even then,
Mayor Giuliani vowed to increase reinforcements (Wolff 1994). The language of the Parks Department
going forward also indicated that the rhetoric of the Giuliani Administration had made an impact. When
speaking to the press about developing strategies to end the sexual attacks, Park Commissioner Henry
J. Stern asserted that the Parks Department wouldn't “tolerate any lowering of the quality of life”
(Martin, “Segregating by Sex” 1994).
Reportedly, the increased police presence at the pools consisted of NYPD officers—not the
Parks Department's own officers, who traditionally had worked at the pools. In fact, while officers were
being increasingly deployed at New York pools, the Parks Department's own staff was being cut. Parks
employees had gone from 4,341 in 1991 to 2,548 in 1995, a reduction of 41% (“Parks and Recreation
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Critical Issues” 1994). In February 1994, Parks Commissioner Stern tried to advocate that his 2,541
employees be exempt from the upcoming fiscal budget cuts, arguing that the park personnel wore
uniforms (uniformed agencies, such as the department of police or sanitation, were exempt from the
cuts). If the department was reduced even further, he warned that the agency would be “unable to
provide adequate security at outdoor pools, parks, and recreation centers” (“Adjusting Parks Severance
Program” 1994). The Parks Commissioner’s plea illustrates what appears to be a vicious cycle central
to the urban governance strategy of the time: as the number of Parks employees and Park Enforcement
Patrol officers at the pools was decreased (because of budget cuts), the number of NYPD officers were
increased (to reinstate order). The strategy also put pressure on the Parks Department in another way:
as the previously varied work of the remaining Park employees (maintaining park grounds, removing
litter, caring for plants) was reduced to only policing, the parks were, of course, neglected, falling
further into despair and disrepair. This paved the road for private philanthropy to take over the
maintenance (and control) of the city's parks.

New Ways of Controlling Crowds at the Pools
After the Department of Parks (and the media) had located the root of the behavioral problems
at the pools—a site-specific “spatial panic”, caused by the unique nature of pools as shared spaces—a
solution began to take shape. This would be, of course, a new spatial strategy created to better control
unruly crowds. In 1994, in a departmental monthly report, the Parks Department stated that new
operating plans would “avoid, or at least minimize, the sorts of behavioral problems at City Pools that
were widely reported last summer” (“Outstanding Issues” 1994). These procedures added to the already
existing ordering strategies, such as mandatory bag checks and, possibly, “the white t-shirt rule”, which
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may have been adopted in the preceding years.
One of the first crowd control initiatives divided the day into “sessions” at select pools in the
Bronx and Brooklyn—ostensibly the pools which had seen the most behavioral issues. The strategy
was, simply, to clear the pool of swimmers between morning and afternoon shifts.
“We believe this will have a calming effect and reduce overcrowding in the afternoon, as a
significant number of patrons who have been in the pool for several hours in the morning will choose
not to wait around for an hour to gain readmission,” explained Parks Commissioner Henry J. Stern in
his monthly report to the Mayor's Office (“Monthly Report for May” 1994). This strategy can be seen
as an attempt to create an institutional boundary in order to control the size of the crowd in the pool.
Elias Canetti argues in his psychological study Crowds and Power, that if crowds are not somehow
interrupted, they will want to grow (23). The following year, the idea of dividing the pools into sessions
became a citywide procedure. Today, the pools still enforce the one-hour break between two sessions of
swimming. There has, however, been no mention of the original intent behind the rule—that is, that
pool patrons leave the pool in order to calm down the “frenetic atmosphere.” Today, the stated rationale
is simply that there is a “break for pool cleaning between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m” (“Free Outdoor
Pools”).
The Parks Department also adopted new ways of ordering through direct spatial changes. In
1994, rope dividers were used to divide the pools into sections, which, as the Parks Department
explained it, would also make it easier to control “unruly behavior.” Again, the experiment targeted
only select pools in Brooklyn and the Bronx. The large pools in the Bronx were divided into three
sections, each of which was designated for different types of activity. One was made into a “Quiet
Zone,” while another, called the “Lap Swim Zone”, was reserved for swimmers. Finally, the remaining
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section, the “General Swim Zone,” was reserved for swimming, water play, hanging out, and every
other water activity the pool had been used for previously (“Monthly Report for May” 1994). Today,
pools citywide are still divided into sections; for example, those who wish to swim laps have their own
section. I believe many consider it a welcome initiative, creating more opportunities for a variety of
leisure activities at the pool. This, of course, was not the original intent behind the initiative; it was a
spatial ordering strategy to make the pools easier to manage, and to control behavior.
Finally, in 1996, a height requirement was adopted requiring swimmers under the age of 16 to
stand 8 inches taller than a pool's maximum depth, or be accompanied by a parent or guardian at least
18 years old. This rule was adopted after a 5-year-old girl, left unattended, had drowned at the Betsy
Head Pool in Brownsville (Herszenhorn 1996). This rule is still in place today (“Pool Rules”).
While some initiatives became permanent, others didn't. The Parks Department experimented
shortly with a requirement that, as patrons entered the pool, they had to sign in, presenting a
membership card acquired with an acceptable form of ID (“Monthly Report for May” 1994). This
initiative was only tried at pools in the Bronx and was abandoned for unknown reasons.
The Crotona Pool in the Bronx was the first site to have camera surveillance installed
(“Monthly Report for May” 1994). By 1996, security cameras had been installed at 20 pools (“Weekly
Report #82” 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s, security cameras became increasingly common in both
private spaces (e.g. high-class private premises—often gated communities) as well those semi-public
(such as shopping malls) and public (the streets and public transport spaces) (Koskela 245). The
introduction of security cameras at the pools provided authorities with the ultimate social control tool.
Geographer Hille Koskela argues that “through surveillance cameras the panoptic technology of power
has been electronically extended, making our cities like enormous panopticons.” In fact, this
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technologizing of space is affecting its very nature. It makes space “a container,” where the person
looking through the monitor is alienated from the people being watched. They become anonymous
“doll-like bodies lacking personal qualities,” and so the technical equipment that separates the two
sides of surveillance “makes it difficult for the space to be recognized as a lived, experienced space”
(Koskela 251).
Even though these new rules and restrictions may seem minor or benign when written on a
poster, many journalists have been baffled by how strictly they were actually enforced by pool staff. In
2003, The New York Times reporter Daniel J. Wakin wrote about his experience going to the Riverbank
State Park Outdoor Pool in Upper Manhattan, a process which, he wrote, resembles “dealing with
invasive and heavy-handed airport security.” Mr. Wakin dubbed the pool “a sea of no's” and described
how he witnessed a family of four being questioned three times about their swimsuits:
“'Do you have mesh? May I see, please?' Having mesh, it seems, is one of the many rules that
make a dip at Riverbank seem like a visit to the penitentiary swimming pool.”
On the Parks Department website, it is stated under “Pool Rules” that “bathing suits must be
worn on the deck and in the water. Men’s bathing suits must have mesh linings.” I have not been able to
trace back the origins of this requirement. It is possible that it was initiated later than 1999, where my
archival research ends—or that records documenting the initiative are simply missing in the (rather
incomplete) archives from the period. A part of the rationale behind this rule is, ostensibly, to prevent
people from swimming in their clothes. The logic at play is that swimsuits are supposed to be cleaner
than street clothes. However, as Naomi Adiv points out, the rule may simply make kids wear their
bathing suit all day, “making it as dirty as anything else” (158). The rule may be arbitrary, but it serves
its clear-cut purpose of social control. According to the British anthropologist Mary Douglas, the idea
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of fighting dirt to secure “purity” is about much more than hygiene. It is a vision of order, making or
keeping the environment understandable and ready for action. Ultimately, imposing ideals of purity on
people is the attempt to control or influence them.
To visit one of New York's outdoor public pools, patrons must bring an approved padlock. This
rule is in place, again ostensibly, to ensure that guests lock up most personal items (including their
phone, wallet, and clothes) and not bring them onto the pool deck. The earliest mention of the rule I
found is from a 2004 news article describing the business opportunities owed to the many rules.
Outside of Astoria Pool in Queens, vendors have set up little shops, where all the supplies required to
get into the pools can be bought:
“We have everything for them to get in,” the vendor Mr. Ahl, who drives in from Long Island
with his sister during the pool season to sell their products, told The New York Times. The reporter
concluded that “when lockless or lining-less pool-goers are turned away, and many are, the Ahls are
there to take care of them” (Vandam, 2004).
Much in line with other spatial strategies, the padlock rule helps control behavior. But it also
makes it impossible to go swimming on an impulse without already being familiar with the pool rules
(not all pools have vendors outside with supplies ready). Either you read up on the rules, or you ask
someone in the know—or you're not going.

The Institutionalization of Zero Tolerance at the Pools
Since the 1990s, crime rates in New York, as well as the rest of the country, have dropped
dramatically. Between 1990 and 1997, the number of homicides in New York City plummeted from
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2,262 to 767, a 66 percent decrease. From 1990 to 1995, there was a 64 percent reduction in robberies,
and by 2002 the overall violent crime rate was lower than ever before (Bowling 534, 544). The policing
of the pools, however, has continued. In a news report from 2012, a South Bronx pool was described as
having five police officers by the pool’s entrance. When it opened that same summer, McCarren pool
had two police officers assigned all day. Both were activated shortly after the pool's opening, as “fights
broke out with a lifeguard over backflips and several arrests were made.” The Thomas Jefferson Park
Pool in East Harlem had “two police officers standing out front who were quickly called in to settle a
dispute between a parks supervisor and a patron who refused to put away her phone by the pool”
(Bellafante 2012). These examples further demonstrate how the Zero Tolerance ordering strategy has
been institutionalized at the pools.

***

Even though the pools are still strictly regulated today, they appear more inclusive than they
have ever been. They are no longer segregated by gender, race, class, or citizenship. In the past, the
pools had charged very minimal fees for entry, but, according to Adiv, all fees were abolished by 1989
(105). The pools, now free for everyone to enter, provide seemingly universal access. However, this
claim is complicated by the regulations, ordering, and surveillance that came into effect in the 1990s.
What do the posted rules, the regulations on the behavior of lifeguards and staff, and the strict
requirement of swimming attire mean to the pool-goers' sense of belonging within the space? As Adiv
points out, access is not just about whether someone can enter a space, but, if they are allowed to enter,
how they do it (Adiv 29-30). At the same time, swimming pools need rational strategies of social
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control (as any shared public space does). Perhaps these strategies are even more warranted in the case
of pools, because the absence of control could be unsafe (possibly deadly) or unclean (a possible health
hazard). As geographer Loretta Lee reminds us, public space cannot be understood through the singular
conceptualization of free and democratic versus repressed and controlled—it is both at the same time:
“The challenge is to appreciate these complex modalities and to make the most of the positive while
resisting the worst” (Lee et al 233).
New York’s public pools are shared spaces of relaxation, play, and socialization. It is for these
reasons that they have attracted, and continue to attract, the public—even if it means being
continuously subjected to the power of authorities.
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Part 4
Luxury Swimming Pools in Bloomberg's Luxury City?
As New York entered a new millennium, the city was once again on a road to change. In the
mayoral elections of 2001, Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire businessman and CEO of the media and
financial services company Bloomberg LP, spent $74 million of his own money on his campaign. This
was not only five times what his opponent Mark J. Green spent, it was a new high for a municipal
campaign (Brash 70). During his campaign, Bloomberg asserted that the city, suffering from the fiscal
effects of the World Trade Center attacks, needed a mayor with his business experience. New York
must have agreed in some way, because the “CEO-mayor” won the election, keeping the title for three
full terms.
Bloomberg was the political embodiment of the neoliberal policies adopted by the city since the
fiscal crisis. As described in part one, the municipal government of post-crisis New York turned
towards nonpolitical expertise and management, often drawn from the private sector. Mayor
Bloomberg promised to deliver a pragmatic and (seemingly) apolitical corporate approach to reshaping
government policy. This worked as the logical extension to the already institutionalized neoliberal
approach to urban governance (Brash 2). With Bloomberg behind the wheel, the city was finally able to
transform into the New York we know today—the white collar-colonized, private wealth-run engine of
capitalism, its glossy $1,886 per square foot highrises reaching for the sky.
Bloomberg took to the task of bettering the city as a CEO would go about bettering his
company. He treated the city government as a corporation, with businesses as clients and residents as
customers. The city itself was a product that needed to be sold in order to ensure growth (as this growth
would balance out budgets). To ensure the sale, it needed to be marketed and branded. Under
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Bloomberg's mayorship, New York was rebranded as a luxury city in order to attract businesses,
investors, and visitors, and keep the city from having to lower its taxes even further (Brash 111–112).
Urban rebranding efforts didn't start with Bloomberg, and as sociologist Miriam Greenberg has shown,
various branding schemes had already been employed to remake the image of New York as a
disorderly, dirty, and crime-ridden city into one that was modern, safe, and business- and touristfriendly (not to mention incredibly wealthy). The most famous example is the “I♥NY” campaign of the
late 1970s (10–12). But, according to Greenberg, the Bloomberg administration “normalized and
institutionalized the branding approach to an unprecedented extent” (13).
During the Bloomberg era, luxury housing projects shot up across the city, and especially in
Williamsburg, Greenpoint, West Chelsea, Harlem, and downtown Brooklyn. Some parks and open
spaces saw substantial development, especially along waterfront areas (Brash 122). The high-end
eighty-story office and luxury housing district, Hudson Yards, basically an extension of Midtown
Manhattan overlooking the water, served as the capstone of the Bloomberg administration’s urban and
economic development strategy (Brash 123). The High Line in Chelsea, a park built atop a railroad
viaduct, came to represent an archetypal urban park of the Bloomberg era: a luxury space, catered
toward an increasingly wealthy neighborhood, that created growth as a tourist destination (Loughran
50). The High Line was created through the efforts of Friends of the High Line, the private group that
manages the park. The maintenance and control of the city's parks through public-private partnerships
had been pioneered by the Central Park Conservancy in 1980 and institutionalized further through the
1990s by both Republican and Democratic mayors. During Bloomberg's mayorship, public–private
partnerships, concession agreements, and philanthropy became the main sources of funding for the
development and maintenance of public space. Some public spaces, such as library branches, have even
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secured funding by selling the land they were placed on to private developers. These developers then
construct new libraries—still owned by the city—with housing above (Nathanson 2017). For example,
the Brooklyn Heights branch of the Brooklyn Public Library has been sold to a private developer who
has redeveloped the land into a luxury condo tower with a new city-owned library (“280 Cadman Plaza
West”).
The conclusion of my thesis is complicated by the development of public, shared space in the
Bloomberg era. Up to this point, I have shown that the understanding of shared space at any given time
is reflected not only in the cultural and political significance of swimming pools, but in how the pools
are managed and controlled. In the Progressive Era, the purpose of shared space was to transform the
unwashed masses into “good Americans.” In the New Deal years, pools were communal spaces, in sync
with the liberal, egalitarian ethos of the time. Since the pools were racially segregated, they became
symbols of how New Deal liberalism compromised its egalitarian principles to maintain the alliance
between southern segregationists and northern politicians. During the 1980s and 1990s, the
environment (and conversation) surrounding the pools reflected the defunding of city services, racial
tensions, and high crime rates. This was the moment that, in the American imagination, the pools
started to be seen as dangerous shared spaces. The city focused on quelling urban disorder by
dramatically increased policing efforts and implementing a zero tolerance approach to even benign
signs of urban disorder. Soon the pools became policed spaces, governed by strict rules and regulations,
as well as spatial ordering strategies.
As pointed out by Naomi Adiv, the growth of public-private partnerships, park conservancies,
and concession agreements after the fiscal crisis (and especially through the Bloomberg era) “suggests
that the free pool should not exist” today (8). I would rather say that the neoliberal turn of urban
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governance suggests that the free pool should have developed into a much different public space than it
is today. As the environment of the public swimming pool has reflected the given political, economic,
and cultural ideology of the time, I would expect the swimming pools of the Bloomberg era to reflect
the ideology of the “luxury city.” It's not hard to imagine how the image of vast, renovated, glossy
swimming pools could be marketed to New Yorkers—and especially to tourists who visit the city in the
hottest months of the year. It’s likely that some of the largest pools could be transformed into quasipublic, corporate spaces comparable to Bryant Park, where profit-making vendors make the park a
growth-creating shared space. Southwest Airlines runs a café in the park (The Southwest Porch), and in
wintertime the park has an ice-skating rink sponsored by CitiBank (CitiPond) that covers the entire
lawn. The bank’s advertisements are prominently displayed rink-side, along with logos of corporate
advertisers, such as Coca-Cola.
One public pool did (briefly) follow a similar route as some of New York's private-sponsored
parks. After being closed for 23 years, McCarren Pool in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, reopened as a
performance space, renovated with private funding. In 2005, the concert promoter Live Nation gave
$250,000 to the City Parks Foundation, a private non-profit entity, to move forward with basic
stabilization and safety improvements to the pool's structure. The renovation was initiated as a venue
for a choreographer named Noémie Lafrance, who proposed a site-specific dance performance called
“Agora,” and also helped raise funds for renovations. The result came the summer after, when the city,
in partnership with Live Nation, organized a series of concerts at McCarren Pool with tickets priced
between $29.50 and $39.50. The space that had been a contested (and very neglected) site for decades
was finally revived as a heavily corporate-branded performance venue, albeit one that mainly catered to
the young people gentrifying Williamsburg and Greenpoint, rather than the pool's original demographic
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(Chronopoulos, “The Politics of Race” 118). It took six more years before McCarren Pool reopened as
a functioning pool, after extensive renovations in 2012.
The corporatization of McCarren Pool has proved to be the exception rather than the rule. So
why haven't public pools transformed along with the rest of New York's corporately run or
philanthropically funded shared spaces? The answer to that question starts well before Michael
Bloomberg. As previously mentioned, the neoliberal transformation of New York dates back to the
fiscal crisis. It was in the 1980s that public-private partnerships, park conservancies, and philanthropic
funding of public space began. By the 1980s, philanthropy had become a desired, fashionable endeavor
among the country's most wealthy, due to government downsizing, the growing inequality gap, and
high-profile coverage of donors (Eikenberry 587). As stated, in the 1980s, an array of partnership
organizations was born, including the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation, which runs and funds
Bryant Park in Midtown Manhattan. The park was renovated by urban developer Dan Biederman and
has become a million-dollar business. The Central Park Conservancy raises 75 percent of Central Park's
annual budget, mostly through private donations (“About Us”). But even though the parks, soon after
the fiscal crisis, garnered private philanthropic interest, it was an entirely different story with the New
York public pools. Besides from the Sol Goldman donation in 1991, private money has not flown
towards the pools. Why? Scholarship on philanthropy shows that people tend to give to causes with
which they can identify, and to which they are physically or emotionally attached—as opposed to
causes or issues that truly need to be addressed (Eikenberry 588). In fact, wealthy philanthropists who
provide the bulk of charitable dollars tend to give to organizations from which they or their family
directly benefit (or have benefitted from in the past). For example, they tend to give a lot to their
university; for the rich, this often means already well-endowed Ivy League schools. In 2012, hedge
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fund manager John Paulson pledged a hundred million dollars to the already well-heeled Central Park
Conservancy, the largest gift to a public park. Paulson was intent on preserving the “urban oasis” in
which he often ran or biked—and which his Fifth Avenue apartment overlooks (Soskis 2013).
I find it likely that public pools have not garnered the same attention from wealthy
philanthropists (on whom New York relies so heavily) because they are not spaces the wealthy attend
themselves. The privatization of pools was the start of the segregation of pools along class lines.
Beginning in the 1950s, middle- and upper-class Americans would increasingly swim at private,
suburban pools, and the lower-class would convene at public municipal pools. What happened to the
pools illustrates the political implications of the privatization of public space, as privatization reinforces
existing patterns of racial and class segregation (Kohn 8). Today, both New York City and its suburbs
are brimming with private options for swimming, catering to a wide range of wallet sizes. A
membership to one of the most prestigious pool clubs in New York, Soho House, costs between $1,050
and $3,200 yearly, not including the $300 application fee—paid regardless of whether or not you are
fortunate enough to be accepted (“Soho House New York Membership”).
Philanthropy aside, the pools could still have developed into corporate-run, private-public
shared spaces, like the city's parks. And yet, they have been left out of the glossy remake of
postindustrial New York. Perhaps they simply failed to fit in with Bloomberg's vision of growth. Along
with most parks, catering towards poor communities and immigrants, they weren't seen as having
enough potential for growth and profit. Urban sociologist Kevin Loughran argues that in contemporary
urban governance, private funding flows towards communities of wealth, or to those that have growth
potential—like the High Line in Chelsea. The development of urban public spaces, in other words,
hinges on a continuum of privilege (49-50). Many public swimming pools are located in low-income
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neighborhoods, such as Bushwick, Harlem, and Red Hook—those with little “growth potential.” But
several are also placed in or nearby affluent neighborhoods. Take for example the Lasker Pool in
Central Park, or the Hamilton Fish Recreation Center next to Alphabet City in Manhattan's Lower East
Side. As mentioned before, this could have something to do with private money flowing towards spaces
the wealthy use themselves. I suggest, however, that the combination of the unique spatial features of
the pools and their problematic history lies at the heart of the answer. It is through this lens that we can
understand why neoliberal urban governance, as it took shape in New York during the 2000s, has
remained uninterested in public swimming pools.
As my thesis sets out to show, there has always existed a consistent duality between the pools as
either democratizing sites of public life, or sites of conflict, regulation, and social control. This constant
negotiation of power has delineated the municipal pools since the very first time New Yorkers jumped
into them. I argue that this dynamic has been more intense at public pools than at most other public
space because pools are more intensely shared spaces. Pools are at once sites of safety, health,
sexuality, and intimacy. These unique traits have made swimming pools attractive spaces to politicians,
urban reformers, and public health officials from the Progressive Era up to the present day—but not to
neoliberal urban developers. Their interest in urban spaces lies mainly in their potential to create fiscal
growth and gentrification.
The pools’ unique characteristics are at the center of their recent problematic history. In the
1980s and 1990s, the pools came to be seen as dangerous sites in the public imagination after episodes
of violence, disorder, and sexual attacks were widely reported in the news media. Other shared spaces,
such as public parks, were constructed in similar ways. But after the New York crime rates went down,
public parks were able to transform their image from being disorderly and crime-ridden areas into safe
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spaces. In spite of public pools also becoming safe, communal, and family-oriented spaces, they may
not have shed their potential to be dangerous sites in the same way public parks have. Perhaps this is
because parks, in contrast to pools, were not seen as the root cause of their own ills. The violence at the
swimming pools was framed as a site-specific problem simply because the pools are an intensely
shared space. I believe the pools' potential to be perceived as dangerous or problematic sites makes
them fundamentally undesirable to private money.
Aside from directly self-serving interest, wealthy people donate to causes that build a legacy. As
the British billionaire John Caudwell put it, philanthropy is about what you'd want to see on your
tombstone (Henley 2012). In 2008, the New York Public Library on Fifth Avenue, the biggest library in
the city, changed the name of its main building to the Stephen A. Schwarzman Building, to honor the
Wall Street financier who contributed $100 million to the institution (Santora 2008). Would Mr.
Schwarzman have made such a huge contribution to a shared, public space if it had the potential of
being involved in a scandalous series of sexual attacks, as witnessed in the 1990s “whirlpooling
menace”? Or if it could be the site of tragic drowning accidents? Or what about an outbreak of disease
through water-transmitted bacteria? In this light, a library, park, or school (especially an Ivy League
university) seems like a much safer bet.
The pools are marked by the urban governance strategies enacted onto them, as well as the
many ways they’ve been conceptualized in the public imagination. Some of these strategies have been
shed, and some have remained. Many of the strict rules and spatial ordering strategies initiated in the
1980s and 1990s are still in place at the pools—only the rationale behind them has changed. Today, the
Parks Department explains the hour-long afternoon break as “a break for pool cleaning” (“Free
Outdoor Pools”); nowhere is the rule’s original intent mentioned—to force pool-goers to leave,

48

resetting the pool’s dynamics. The Parks Department explains the “white t-shirt rule” as a precaution to
ensure dye doesn't run into the pools, hardly explaining why the same rule applies to those on the deck
(Rich, 2014).
But there is an irony in this analysis of the public pool as a palimpsest, on which history (both
good and bad) has been written. While the pools have transformed over time, they have simultaneously
remained the same. The pools today are still free. They are still a space where New Yorkers can
participate in communal activities. They are still in public hands. Across New York neighborhoods,
they seem to have resisted the gentrification many other public spaces have bowed to—even in the
most thoroughly gentrified neighborhoods, like Park Slope and Williamsburg, where other public
spaces, such as playgrounds, have transformed along with the locals. It seems that even though the
“problematic” character of the pools have made them a poor match for private investment, growthminded funding, and gentrification, it has been crucial in their resistance of the latest neoliberal
transformation. They are, in essence, a last holdout against gentrification. When interpreting the history
of the pools through this lens, the very story of urban swimming pools becomes one not mainly of
control and discipline, but of resistance. Pools have been bulldozed out of racist fears, threatened by
urban sprawl, and stigmatized as dangerous spaces, and still they remain open. When budget cuts kept
them closed (probably for the first time in the history of municipal pools), the urban youth answered
back by opening fire hydrants, sending millions of gallons of water into the streets. These teens were
sending a powerful message to the city about the role that municipal pools play in New York
communities, especially for kids and youngsters. They were showing the people in charge that they
would put up a struggle before losing a public space they considered theirs, and a part of their right to
the city. I understand their actions not as vandalism, “moral poverty,” or delinquency. In fact, I think
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there was a message hanging in the heavy, humid air above the drenched streets in the summer of 1991:
Keep your hands off our swimming pools.
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